ECLIP II Workshop on Security Aspects of Computer Crime (24 January 2001)
Human Rights and the RIP Act
Caspar Bowden (email@example.com),
- Is computer analysis of traffic data a qualitatively new form of
- Is compelling disclosure of a key or password self-incrimination
- does it matter whether password written down ?
- testimonial value - Sergienko ?
- and Cybercrime treaty ? Article 18.1a & Article 19.4 ?
- Burden-of-proof on key-possession
- What is "proportionate" ?
- HOW WILL HOME SECRETARY'S JUDGEMENTS ON PROPORTIONALITY STAY IN
TUNE WITH THE COURTS?
- is "proportionate" to be assessed by reference to the
individual target ? Perhaps intrusive surveillance (or "forensic
hacking") would in fact be less "intrusive" than
obtaining a key or intercepting?
- LBRP and
proportionality: use of anonymising web proxies and personal
keys by employees at work ?
- in context of obtaining a key :
- (S.49.2.b.ii) court order because a public authority considers it necessary ?
- for prevention/detection of (not serious) crime ?
- (S.51.5.a) re: "the extent and nature of any protected information,
in addition to the protected information in respect of which the
disclosure requirement is imposed, to which the key is also a key";
(CJP2001 and fishing expeditions ?)
- to future information - long-term key not session key (is likely to
do so's in S.49.1)
- (S.54.3) Imposing a secrecy condition
- "it is reasonable, in order to maintain the effectiveness of any
investigation or operation or of investigatory techniques generally, or
in the interests of the safety or well-being of any person, to keep
secret from a particular person."
- "generally" vs. "particular person"
- key revocation - the AA-salute
- Is the Tribunal adequate ?
- decides cases where authority is non-judicial (SoS, police, customs,
- separate hearings - arguments of extreme technical complexity cannot
- no special advocate
- no right to summary of evidence
- no right to cross-examine
- likely to be frequently tested (against only 8 cases in 15 years under IOCA)
- Is the Commissioner likely to detect or deter abuse ?
- "reliable and verifiable technical means" ?
- independent investigative capability ? (cf. ISC)
- vast extension of work
- S.16.3 allows connection of
ISP/telco "backbones" to
- clarified in meetings with officials and in Hansard that this is
- NTAC say nothing to do with them
- much broader than "Carnivore"-laws - can trawl using
- Steganography, stealth channels, encrypting proxies and anonymisers ???